PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

APPROPRIATION OF LAND.

In United States v. Lynah, 23 S. C. R. 349, the Supreme
Court of the United States holds that the turning of a valu°
able rice plantation into an irreclaimable and
what
constitutes
valueless bog, as the necessary result of an imCoapensation provement in navigation undertaken by the
United States Government, is a taking of the land, within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and therefore the liability of the United States to
make just compensation exists and is not defeated because
such land was taken by the Government in the exercise of its power to improve navigation. Compare Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, where it was held that the
destruction of access to land abutting on a navigable river
by the construction by Congress of a pier on the submerged
lands in front of the upland was not a taking of private
property for public uses, but only an instance of consequential injury to the property of the riparian owner.
CORPORATIONS.

In CimberlandLumber Co. v. Clinton Hill Lumber Co.,
54 Atl. 452, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that
while the stockholders of a corporation cannot
I.Solvency:
Individual
interpose any defences to an insolvency suit
Stockholders against it that the corporation itself cannot set
up, they can have the validity of matters alleged as a defence
to their liability as stockholders adjudicated in suits brought
by the receiver to collect assessments levied against them.
Consequently, the insolvency proceeding is not conclusive
upon their liability when the suit is brought by the receiver.
In Avery v. Preston NationalBank, 93 N. W. 1062, the
Supreme Court of Michigan holds that where a trustee in
Receivers:
Trust

a mortgage for the benefit of certain creditors

including a bank realized under the mortgage,

Funds
and deposited the proceeds in the bank in his
own name, and subsequently he was appointed receiver for

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CORPORATIONS (Continued).

the mortgagor, as between the receiver and the bank, the
receiver was entitled to the funds, and the bank could not
withhold them onthe ground that they were a trust fund,
and really belonged to the bank. Further, in a suit by the
executor of the receiver against the bank, questions as to the
disposition of the fund involved in the accounting of the
receiver's successor could not be determined.

CRIMINAL LAW.

In Whorley v. State, 33 Southern, 849, the Supreme
Court of Florida (Division A) holds that in order to convict a person of being accessory after the fact
Accessory
after the
to a felony, it is, of course, indispensably necesFact
sary to prove that the party charged, at the time
he rendered the forbidden aid or assistance to the felon,
knew that he had committed a felony, or was an accessory
before the -fact to a felony; and it must be further shown
that the aid or assistance given was done with the intention
and for the purpose of helping the felon to avoid or escape
detection, arrest, trial or punishment.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

The fact that it is provided in almost all the states, if not
in all, that a person accused of a crime may testify, but
that his failure to do so shall not be commented
F:Ilure.of
upon renders the case of People v. Hammond, 93
Defendawtto
Testify
N. W. 1O84, of general interest. In that case the
prosecuting attorney in closing said, in response to a statement by defendant's counsel: "Defendant's counsel when
he said that the people's witnesses and God were the only
ones who knew the contents of the telegrams, forgot his
client, whom it is alleged the telegrams were sent to, and
whom it is claimed sent one of them." The Supreme Court
of Michigan holds that this statement was not error, especially in view of the fact that the jury were instructed that
the failure of the defendant to testify in his own behalf
should not weigh against him. The inference, however,
from the words used seems not far to find.
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GIFTS.

A husband instructed a bank, in which he had a savings
account, to put the name of his wife on his book opposite
Savings
his name, so that she could draw from the
Deposit
account, stating that it was as much hers as his.
When making his will he stated that the money in the bank
was already settled, and that it belonged to the wife, and
he told another that his wife had control over the money
the same as he did. The Supreme Court of Michigan holds
in Burns v. Burns, 93 N. W. 1077, that these facts do not
show a gift of the money to the wife. See Brown v. Brawn,
23 Barb. 565.
INSURANCE.

In Schmidt v. Philadelphia Underwriters, 33 Southern,
9o7, the Supreme Court of Louisiana holds that the delib-

erate and fraudulent attempt of the plaintiff to
impose upon the defendant insurance company
liability for a loss which he has not sustained defeats his
right to recover according to the terms of the contract upon
which he sues. See Claflin v. Ins. Co., i oU. S. 8i.
Fraud of
Plaintiff

INSURANCE COMPANIES.

In New York Life Ins. Co. v. N. L. Curry & Bro., 72
S. W. 736, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that a
provision in a contract of loan from an insurLoans:
Policies
ance company for which its paid-up policy is
Collateral
pledged as collateral, that on default in payment
of interest for thirty days the policy shall, at the company's
option, be surrendered to it at the customary cash surrender
value then allowed by the company for the surrender of
policies of that class is void. It is permitted, it is held, to
the insurer to forfeit the policy for failure to pay a premium,
but not to forfeit merely as a penalty for the non-payment
of borrowed money. Compare Montgomery v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 72 S. W. 736.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The daily press has already made the readers of the
acquainted with the decision of the United States
Regulation by Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames, 23 S. C.
REGISTER
Congress

R. 321, where it is held that the carriage of

lottery tickets from one state to another by an express com-
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pany engaged in carrying freight and packages from state
to state is interstate commerce, which Congress, under its
power to regulate, may prohibit by making it an offence
against the United States to cause such tickets so to be
carried. The significance of the case seems to consist in its
being an entire prohibition of interstate commerce in a
certain article "for the purpose of guarding the people of
the United States against the 'widespread pestilence of lotteries' "-apparently a police regulation, and also in its
possible bearing upon anti-trust legislation, so far as concerns the suggestion that Congress may penalize interstate
commerce in "trust" articles. As in many of the recent
important cases the decision is by a bare majority, four
judges dissenting.

JOINT-STOCK ASSOCIATION.

In re Pittsburg Wagoan Works' Estate, 54 At. 316, it
appeared that an unincorporated joint-stock association was
organized to buy real estate, the title to which
Personal
Property:
xfecution

was held in trust for the association. The inter-

est of each member was to be determined by the
number of shares which he held, which he could sell only
by transferring on the books of the company. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania holds that, just as in the case of an
incorporated company, the interest of a member was personal property and could not be sold under an execution as
real estate.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Where a landlord takes charge of the premises after
abandonment by the tenant merely to protect them from
injury, or knowing that the tenant does not
Assent to
Abandonment intend to return, rents them on the latter's
of Term
account, such acts may not show an assent to the
abandonment; but where he takes possession and rents the
premises on his own account, it is conclusive evidence of
surrender and acceptance: Supreme Court of Arkansas in
Hayes v. Goldan, 72 S. W. 563. It is for the jury to
decide which is the proper construction to be put upon the
facts.
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MISTAKE OF LAW.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in'Swisscher v.
Commonwealth, 72 S. W. 306, that under the Kentucky
statute providing that whoever carries conExcuse
cealed a deadly weapon shall be punished, it is
no defence that one thought he had a right under a certain
statute to carry a pistol, and would have had had the statute
been constitutional.
NATIONAL BANKS.

The Supreme Court of the United States holds in Easton
v. State of Iowa, 23 S. C. R. 288, that a state statute which'
state
attempts to prohibit national banks from reRegulation
ceiving deposits when insolvent, and prescribes
a punishment for a violation of such prohibition by any
officer or agent thereof, is invalid as an attempt to control
and regulate the business operations of national banks.
The state statute was general in terms, but is held incap-"
able of application to national banks. Compare the recent
case of Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U. S. 275.
NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Powelson
v. United Traction Co., 54 Atl. 282, that to step on or off
a moving car, whether the power which propels
Boarding a
Moving
the car be steam or electricity is per se negliElectricCar

gence, but that to this rule there are exceptions,

particularly in the case of electric cars. That these exceptions make the statement of the general rule somewhat questionable appears from the application of the principle in this
case, where the evidence showed that the plaintiff attempted
to board an open car, and waved his hand when he saw it
coming about one hundred feet distant; that when it reached
the plaintiff it had almost stopped, and he stepped on the
running board, and was about to go into the car, when the
conductor rang the bell, and the car started, and threw him
off. The court holds that the question is for the jury. See
Walters v. Phila. Traction Co., 161 Pa. 36.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in
Timms v: Old Colony. St. Ry., 66 N. E. 797, that in an acStreet
tion against a street railway company for injurRailway
ies to a passenger, evidence showing that the
plaintiff, who was standing near the edge of the rear plat-
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form without holding on to anything, was pitched off by a
sudden jerk in the car, caused by a sudden stop, without
showing that there was any defect in the car or rails, or that
the apparently sudden stop was not justifiable, fails to show
any negligence on the part of the defendant. See and compare Byron v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 177 Mass. 303.
PARZNT AND CHILD.

In Callaghan v. Lake Hopatcong Ice Co., 54 Atl. 223,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey holds that where a son,
who stands in the relation of a servant to his
Injury to
Son:
father is disabled by the tortious act of another,
Actionby
the father may maintain an action per quod
Father
servitum amisit against the tort feasor, and
therein recover the damages sustained by him during the
son's lifetime, notwithstanding that in consequence of the
same tortious act the son dies at a later time.
PERCOLATING WATERS.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in Stillwater

Water Co. v. Farner, 93 N. W. 907, that except for the
Diversion:

benefit and improvement of his own premises,
or for his own beneficial use, the owner of land
has no right to drain, collect or divert percolating waters
thereon, when such acts will destroy or materially injure the
spring of another person, the waters of which spring are
used by the general public for domestic purposes. An action
may be maintained by an injured party to restrain and prohibit such waste. The case presents an excellent review of
cases related to the question passed upon. See and compare Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520.
Injunction

PHOTOGRAPHS.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey in McLean v. Erie R.
Co., 54 Atl. 238, holds the following instruction by the
Instrutions trial judge as to photographs to be not erroneby Judze
ous: "I have admitted these photographs in
evidence. They are put before you. You ought to look at
them with a good deal of caution. I suppose all of" you
know that a photograph of natural scenery is more or less
misleading as to distance, on account of what the artist
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would call perspective or want of perspective.
Do not be
misled by the photographs in an estimate of distance. In
that respect, it is fair to say that they are unavoidably misleading. It is the nature of photography."
SURFACE WATER.

In Stocker v. Nemaha County, 93 N. W. 721, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska holds that a county is not liable to landLiabiinty of owners for injuries caused by the discharge of
County
surface water from ditches constructed by the
county authorities, diverting -such water from its natural
course. See Green v. Harrison County, 61 Iowa, 311.
TRUST FUNDS.

A trust fund does not lose its character as such by being
deposited by the trustee in a bank to his .owncredit, but, to
Liablity of
hold the bank therefor, it must be pleaded and
Bank
proved that the fund remains in the bank in
some form: Supreme Court of Nebraska in Chamberlain v.
ChamberlainBanking House, 93 N. W. l021.
VALUE OF 4AND.

In Friday v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 54 Atl. 339, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania lays down several rules
with reference to the proper method of presentEvidence
ing expert testimony as to the value of land.
The witness, it is held, should fix the price from a knowledge of the price at which lots are generally held for sale
and at which they are sometimes sold in the course of ordinary business in the neighborhood. Where a witness testifies as to the value of property to be condemned, he should,
be required to designate the properties in the vicinity with
which he is acquainted, and set forth the source of his
knowledge of their values. Further where an expert as to
values of real estate has testified as to his qualifications,
the opposing party should be allowed to cross-examine him
before he is permitted to testify. Finally where a witness
as to value has given his opinion, and has also stated that he
would give the price named for the property, an instruction
leaving the impression upon the jury that the estimate of the
witness was entitled to great weight because of his apparent
willingness to purchase is error.

